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The Code of Federal Regulations is unambigu-ous in regard to providing research subjects the information that provides the underpinning of 
informed consent: “The information that is given to 
the subject or the representative shall be in language 
understandable to the subject or the representative.”1 
This is a straightforward requirement, but not an 
easy one. To risk belaboring the obvious, it is also the 
dialogue, not the signed document alone, that provides 
the basis for informed consent.2 It is the researcher’s 
responsibility to provide accurate, complete, and unbi-
ased verbal and written information yet, as this essay 
discusses, challenges to meaningful research consent 
abound in the communication between researcher 
and subject. This discussion of these challenges is far 
from exhaustive, but it will flag some of the potholes 
that researchers must anticipate on the sometimes 
rocky road to eliciting meaningful consent. 
These hazards include unfamiliar scientific terms 
and connotations, divergent conceptions of medical 
history and science, the conscious and unconscious 
deploying of rosy adjectives with which scientists 
sometimes “sell” a study in lieu of describing it, semi-
otics that magnify the therapeutic illusion, and legal 
maneuvers that bypass consent altogether. Even the 
deceptively optimistic acronyms by which many medi-
cations and clinical trials are known — LIVE, CURE 
or MIRACL, anyone? — present semantic pitfalls that 
undermine objectivity, impede communication, and 
distort the appropriateness of and expectations of 
medical research.
It is the researcher’s duty to bridge the gap in order 
to effect informed consent, or indeed, any meaningful 
species of consent. The typical US researcher is fluent 
in English and hyper fluent in medical jargon; how-
ever, many agree that the average subject reads Eng-
lish at an eighth-grade level and is quite innocent of 
medical argot.3 
Researcher-subject perspectives on medical research 
are also likely to differ accordingly. The researcher and 
the subject often share a broad culture, as evinced by 
their common language, nationality, and geographical 
locus. But within this larger overarching culture, par-
ties to this research dyad also tend to possess distinct 
cultural identities that differ widely in religious beliefs 
and customs, native tongue or patois, familiarity with 
scientific terms, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and 
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a dramatically different history of treatment in the 
medical-research arena. 
Even subjects and researchers who share a mother 
tongue tend to speak different medical languages. 
For example, a 2000 study of rural African Ameri-
cans found that “31% of subjects who answered “yes” 
to whether they had “sugar” at the screening had 
answered “no” to the survey question about diabetes. 
Subjects who believed they had “sugar” felt their con-
dition was less serious and had higher glucose levels 
than those who said they had diabetes.” 4 
Clinicians may unintentionally sow seeds of mis-
understanding well before the informed-consent pro-
cess begins. Especially when they are delivered by the 
patient’s physician rather than a study researcher, the 
earliest discussions about the purpose of a trial, which 
predate the formal informed-consent process, may 
easily raise expectations or imply promises of treat-
ment outcomes — promises that cannot be delivered 
in a research setting.  When the personal physician 
tells her patient, “We have another option: a drug that 
I think can help you: come in and we’ll discuss get-
ting you into the trial,” the oft-blurred line between 
research and treatment may be hopelessly effaced as 
unrealistic expectations are conveyed. 
Subject Literacy
The 1998 article “Patient Literacy, a Barrier to Quality 
of Care,”5 established that adults tend to read three to 
five grades lower than the highest grade they finish, so 
that potential research subjects who are high-school 
graduates should be presented with consent forms 
written at about an eighth-grade reading level.6 Subse-
quent studies have not materially challenged this find-
ing. Yet other investigations consistently demonstrate 
that the language in such documents fails readability 
scores and is sometime so impenetrable that scientists 
themselves are unable to understand them. 
In fact, Randy K. Otto and James Ogloff found that 
consent forms directed at adults contemplating medi-
cal research boast 16th-grade readability levels,7 which 
would preclude the participation of anyone who is not 
a candidate for a master’s degree or higher, given the 
finding that adults read as many as five grades below 
their highest completed grade. Moreover, the exces-
sive length of many informed-consent forms militates 
against their being completely read and understood by 
potential subjects.8 
Not only are consent forms complex and lengthy, 
they are rife with medical jargon. Jargon is useful 
shorthand for research scientists that allows them 
to discuss complex topics elegantly and succinctly, 
but jargon does more than include scientists: it also 
excludes the lay public, the pool from which most sub-
jects are drawn. In so doing, it operates against the 
ubiquitous goal of informing the subject before pro-
curing his consent. 
Many researchers turn to tools to ensure the read-
ability of their documents, but a Southern Illinois 
University assessment of randomly selected consent 
forms discovered that when these forms were ana-
lyzed in accordance with the Flesch Reading Ease, 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level, Coleman-Liau Grade 
Level, and the Bormuth Grade Level, each exceeded 
the (approximately eighth-grade) reading level of the 
general population.9
Researchers also turn to readability formulae that 
ease readability assessments by automating the fea-
tures of document analysis, not always realizing that 
an overreliance on such formulae, which assess the 
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number of words per sentence, the number of syllables 
per word, and that rely upon word-difficulty lists, is 
an error. Unfamiliar short terms and words, such as 
“os,” or “b.i.d.” can be as just as difficult to understand 
as longer ones, with the added difficulty of providing 
fewer recognizable clues from Latin or Greek root 
words. Moreover, although some such formulae are 
very easy to use, they have limitations: The Fry Read-
ability Graph is accurate to 12th grade level, but the 
Flesch Readability Formula, for example, is reliable 
only up to the seventh-grade level — below the recom-
mended eighth-grade level for consent forms.10 
Semantic Masks and Semiotics 
Some other intelligibility failings are due to technical 
terminology, like randomization, that diverges from 
common and colloquial definitions. Drug nomencla-
ture adds to the confusion: only 53 percent of people 
in a New Jersey IRB survey recognized acetamino-
phen as the active ingredient in Tylenol and other 
common OTC painkillers.11 Scarcely 15 years after the 
banning of the infamous German teratogen Thalido-
mide from the market, tests of it and its analogues 
under unfamiliar names such as Synovir and lenalid-
omide shrouded the drug’s identity in clinical stud-
ies against myeloma and leprosy in Europe and the 
developing world.12 It has not helped that until 1979, 
West African promotional materials still described 
thalidomide as “completely harmless,” adding to the 
iatrogenic confusion.
Not all communication hurdles are verbal. The 
very act of signing a consent form sometimes causes 
participants to believe that they have signed away or 
waived their rights and so have no recourse if they 
are misled or harmed by the research study.13 A dra-
matic instance of this phenomenon was recounted 
in the volume Acres of Skin: Human Experiments at 
Holmesburg Prison,14 a chronicle of Albert Kligman’s 
research at Philadelphia’s Holmesburg Prison Com-
plex from 1951 through 1974. Many prisoners stated 
they were harmed by experiments that seemed to vio-
late basic ethical strictures, but explained their slow-
ness or failure to seek legal redress after their release 
to their belief that they had signed waivers that pre-
vented them from pursuing justice; they did not know 
that they cannot legally sign away their rights to seek 
justice in such an instance. 
It is possible that the inmates did sign waivers, but 
given the general low level of literacy in the population, 
it is also possible that they mistook consent forms for 
waivers. Researchers can avoid such misunderstand-
ings by offering verbal as well as written reassurance 
that subjects have not waived the right to complain 
and can seek recourse in such cases.15
There seem many other workable avenues for 
addressing these sorts of informed-consent barriers, 
such as simplifying the forms’ language and provid-
ing supplemental brochures and handouts. Simply 
asking the subject to “repeat back” what he had been 
told about the study to the researcher, who gives cor-
rective feedback until the subject’s comprehension 
seems complete, has worked well. In a research study, 
this step added only 3 minutes to the conventional 
process.16
Trials of electronic informed consent, in which 
subjects completed digital rather than paper docu-
ments within a program that gave information as it 
was requested, resulted in a greater understanding of 
the study than the use of conventional paper docu-
mentation.17 Another trial of women suggested that 
watching videotaped educational tools helped to score 
56 percent higher on knowledge assessments than 
women who saw no such video in addition to conven-
tional informed consent procedures.18 
Not only scientific terminology but modern research 
practices have caused inevitable confusion that pre-
cludes voluntary and meaningful and consent. 
Consent Optional
In the research arena, the naming problem even 
impinges upon the acronyms by which clinical trials 
are known because they can undermine objectivity 
about the appropriateness of and expectations from 
the research. One example is the manner in which 
researchers refer to the 1996 amendment to the Code 
of Federal Regulations 21 50.24, which allows testing 
under an exception to informed consent under certain 
conditions. Persons who urgently need care and are 
unable to give consent, often because they are uncon-
scious from trauma, can be enrolled in studies without 
any attempt to garner consent from them, their loved 
ones, or their legal representatives. Within this essay 
I often refer to such studies as “no-consent” or “non-
consensual” trials, because dispensing with informed 
consent is the salient feature of such studies for the 
laypersons who comprise the subject pool. 
Although ethicists and researchers coolly write 
of the rationale for and efficiency of such studies, its 
potential subjects, relatively few of whom are aware 
that legal waivers to research consent exist, share a 
different perspective. Many have read or heard widely 
of the troubling abrogation of informed consent in the 
US Public Health Service-conducted Tuskegee syphilis 
study, of the appropriation of cells from an unwitting 
Henrietta Lacks over the strident objections of her 
husband, of the highly publicized research deaths of 
subjects like Ellen Roche at Johns Hopkins, as well as 
of Jesse Gelsinger and Nicole Wan at the universities 
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of Pennsylvania and Rochester (New York), respec-
tively. From the perspective of many research subjects, 
informed consent is less a malleable abstraction to be 
debated than an essential layer of protection. 
However, researchers’ writings describe noncon-
sensual studies differently, as “emergency research” 
as they aver that medical urgency excuses dispens-
ing with consent in life-or-death situations, although 
they must conflate research with urgent care in order 
to do so. This emphasis on “emergency” nomen-
clature deflects attention from lack of consent and 
simultaneously stresses a rationale for such stud-
ies — an emergent situation in which the subject is 
unconscious or incapacitated to give consent, yet in 
which something novel must be urgently be done to 
save him — and to study how better to deal with such 
emergencies. Substituting “emergency” for “noncon-
sensual” deftly sidesteps the fact that this is research, 
not treatment, for which no consent or refusal is 
sought and for which most subjects have no way to 
refuse participation. 
Even intramedical discussions debating the mer-
its of this consent issue sometimes do so obliquely, 
as “50.24 studies” or even more opaquely, by using 
the acronym EFIC, which stands for “exception from 
informed consent.” Among medical professionals, 
EFIC is an instantly recognizable umbrella term for 
research under 50.24, but this term would mystify 
laypersons. 
It is far from the only troubling acronym labeling 
contemporary medical research studies. 
Acronym Required
Such shorthand terms for medical studies were 
once the exception, except for cardiology research, 
which has long embraced them. But over the past 
two decades, medical researchers have become hotly 
enamored of acronyms, which the Oxford English 
Dictionary defines as “[a]n abbreviation formed from 
the initial letters of other words and pronounced as a 
word.” It is taken from the Greek akron ‘end, tip’ and 
onuma ‘name.’ Unlike mere initialisms, which con-
sist of the phrase or title’s initial letters that are pro-
nounced separately (e.g., FDA, MRI) acronyms are 
pronounceable words. 
Moreover, fudging is common, and acronyms are 
often constructed by selecting letters other than the 
initial ones, and even by slipping in letters that do not 
appear in the title. However they are generated, some 
of these nicknames that researchers give their stud-
ies, such as CURE (Clopidogrel In Unstable Angina 
To Prevent Recurrent Events Trial Investigators)19 or 
HOPE (Heart Outcomes Prevention Evaluation) raise 
concerns — and expectations. 
Acronyms, once rare, have now grown so numerous 
that today, one can hardly recall a word that has not 
been pressed into service — or invented. Acronym tri-
als are now the norm, and are especially popular in 
research funded by pharmaceutical companies. But, 
what is the attraction?
Acronyms are designed to persuade subjects, other 
scientists, or both, depending upon the intent of the 
study, of the study’s virtues. It is easy to grasp the 
attraction of a study nicknamed CURE,20 HOPE,21 or 
ALIVE,22 which introduces the research with a posi-
tive connotation. In what psychologists call “auto-
matic attitude activation,” the mind evaluates and 
attaches positive or negative values to the stimuli 
evoked even before being conscious of the reaction.”23 
In short, the positive emotion evoked by the chip-
per acronym eclipses the very logical thought upon 
which informed consent, or any consent, should be 
predicated. 
Researchers know too much science to be so eas-
ily swayed, one would think, and they develop habits 
of intellectual rigor that inoculate them against the 
worst deceptions. For example, although it allows him 
to hope that the tested preparation will be effective, 
the requirement of equipoise dictates that a research-
er’s professional stance must be a genuine uncertainty 
about the outcome of the trial. But the subject need 
operate under no such compunction or mindset and, 
unfortunately, these acronyms make implicit promises 
to her with no proof that the study can deliver.
Despite this, authors and their funders have 
embraced acronyms in hopes that their semantic felic-
ities will enhance perception of their studies’ quality24 
and will serve as a mnemonic aid, helping others to 
remember their research, and so distinguishing their 
study from the common herd. Successful acronyms do 
this so well that they can consign the labels and titles 
they replace to oblivion. We’re all familiar with radar, 
lasers, and scuba gear, but who remembers radio 
detecting and ranging, light amplification by stimu-
lated emission of radiation, or self-contained under-
water breathing apparatus?25 All this retention and 
positive attention, authors reason, can elevate their 
studies’ citation rates.
Yet all is not relentless optimism when it comes to 
research acronyms: scientists are also fond of classical 
allusions that clothe a trial in an aura of borrowed wis-
dom and gravitas. Beginning in 1986 a related group 
of ISIS trials took the name of the Egyptian goddess 
of health. ATHENA, PALLAS, PLATO, SOCRATES, 
and of course, OSIRIS26 were not far behind, lend-
ing a patina of wisdom to the studies, as does the 
EINSTEIN trial.27 Investigators hope that this whiff 
of erudition will also pay off in impressed subjects, 
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increased impact and citations. And indeed, studies 
with acronyms do enjoy greater prominence than so-
called “anonymous” studies without them. 
The Cochrane Heart Group scrutinized 173 ran-
domized studies published before 2003 and found 
that three prestigious journals — Circulation, the 
Lancet, and the New England Journal of Medicine 
— published 61 percent of the acronym studies. Stud-
ies with an acronym had higher Jadad methodologic 
quality scores28 and were able to enroll five times as 
many patients as those without — although they 
were no more likely than others to emerge with posi-
tive results. Thus, acronyms have repeatedly been 
shown to deliver, boosting not only scientists’ ability 
to remember the research, but also to remember it 
positively and on the whole, acronym studies do enjoy 
higher citation rates. 
So. it is not surprising that acronym studies have 
burgeoned, increasing tenfold over 6 years from 1996 
until 2002. Today, most studies are referred to by 
acronyms.29 James P. Orlowski, M.D., and James A. 
Christensen, acknowledge the power of acronyms to 
sway scientists and subjects, and they are concerned 
enough to castigate many as “coercive.” In a report for 
Chest they determined that 155 (6.5 percent) of the 
2383 clinical-trial acronyms they evaluated were coer-
cive and they summarize: “A distraught or frightened 
patient with a life-threatening illness who is offered 
a research study with an acronym of CURE, HOPE, 
HELP, IMPROVED, LIFE, RESCUE, MIRACL(sic), 
SAVED, or ALIVE is possibly being coerced by the 
acronym. Institutional review boards and the medi-
cal research community would not tolerate a CRT 
entitled, ‘A Surefire Cure for Cancer,’ they write. “They 
should be no more tolerant of a CRT with an acronym 
listed above.”30 
Many ethicists would quibble with the label “coer-
cive,” which typically is reserved for more extreme 
volitional pressures. Yet one needn’t hold a gun to 
the head of a seriously ill and frightened subject with 
diminishing options who is looking into the abyss 
in order to achieve a coercive level of influence. An 
expert need merely suggest, even implicitly, that the 
CURE trial is all that stands between him and the end. 
The suggestion of an actual “cure” may remain sub-
liminal: it need not be uttered, but it is there in the 
trial’s name, and perhaps looms large in his decision, 
triggering “emotions, memories, or hopes that might 
subliminally sway a potential research subject to par-
ticipate in a research trial.”31
FDA regulations don’t directly address acronyms, 
but the agency is alive to the risk of such undue influ-
ence on patients and subjects. Their draft regulatory 
guidance on informed consent32 states that “overly 
optimistic representations of the clinical investigation 
may be misleading and may violate FDA regulations 
that prohibit promotion of investigational drugs and 
devices.”33
Moreover, the FDA does seek to rein in the opti-
mism of, for example, medication brand names that 
impart misleading linguistic cues born of marketing 
psychology and scientific testing. In addition to guard-
ing against drug names that look or sound similar 
enough to trigger one in four US medication errors 
when one is mistaken for another,34 the FDA’s Divi-
sion of Drug Marketing, Advertising and Communi-
cations rejects suggestive brand names that imply a 
benefit the medication does not impart, that downplay 
its risks, or that suggest a drug works for conditions 
for which it is not approved.35 It is true, however, that 
some names seem to slip through the cracks: Concerta 
for ADHD sounds like “concentrate,” and Relenza to 
offer “relief from influenza.”36 
Even so, the FDA rejects two of every five sug-
gested brand names. The agency also contributes to 
the phenomenon of increasingly strange-sounding 
and unpronounceable brand names by insisting upon 
names that are clearly distinguishable from each other, 
which has become nearly impossible because of the 
plethora of drug names already circulating. In addi-
tion, the FDA militates against intelligibility by ban-
ning “overly fanciful” names — No “Cancer-Be-Gone” 
or “HepC Helper” — and this encourages drug mak-
ers to pursue Latinate or chemically referential rather 
than easily recognizable and accessible drug names. 
Many unpronounceable drug names feature X’s and 
Z’s because these letters were once rare and helped the 
medications to stand out.
The consultants who devise new brand names, like 
the researchers who devise catchy acronyms, seek 
standouts that differ from other names and that doc-
tors will remember, sometimes sending coded allu-
sions to prescribing physicians; Liptor for example, 
lowers lipids. Sometimes brand names send a message 
to the patients as well, like Tamiflu, whose name sug-
gests that it may “tame the flu.” But the more usual 
long, technical-sounding, tongue-twisters of today 
can provoke alienation and even fear in some patients 
and subjects,37 a problem of which the pharmaceutical 
companies seem insufficiently aware. 
Although acronym-named studies are no more 
likely than other studies to result in positive conclu-
sions, the pharmaceutical industry is four times as 
likely to be fund them and the studies are eight times 
as likely to be authored by an industry employee than 
other studies.38
In fact, pharmaceutical funders are so enamored 
of acronyms that researchers are running out of new 
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ones, which drives a serious duplication problem. For 
example, in 2015, Tsung O. Cheng listed 40 distinct 
studies using the acronym HEART, and ClinicalTri-
als.gov displays 47 SMART, 16 HOPE, and six CURE 
studies. This embarrassment of riches means that a 
PubMed search for one of these acronyms can easily 
result in the scientific equivalent of the phone book, 
counteracting the original purpose of helping the 
study stand out in a field of similar research, and mak-
ing research into individual studies a Sisyphean task. 
Cheng further writes that the industry’s appetite 
for acronyms now leads it to paper over original study 
titles with an acronym — after the fact. A completed 
trial of amiodarone, for example was retroactively 
dubbed the Amiodarone Resuscitation of REfractory 
Sustained ventricular Tachyarrhythmias (ARREST) 
trial, at the insistence of pharmaceutical sponsors — 
although the acronym was never mentioned in the 
original article. Cheng also recounts how some inves-
tigators first produce an acronym, then flesh out a title 
to support it.39
Speaking in Tongues
What about researcher literacy? Much attention is 
paid, and rightly so, to the challenges presented by low 
scientific literacy within the subject pool. But literacy 
failings dog well-educated researchers as well as sub-
jects, and these also contribute to readability issues.
In The Elements of Style, William Strunk, Jr., 
advised, “Do not be tempted by a twenty-dollar word 
when there is a ten-center handy, ready and able,”40 but 
few academics seem to listen. Informed consent forms, 
like other works generated within academia, some-
time fail to define terms that are common to scientists 
but not to lay readers, a disaster for communication. 
Unfortunately, the conventions of academic scien-
tific writing sometimes encourage pretentious, unnec-
essarily complex wording and unwieldy sentence con-
struction. Sadly, this is often the hallmark of what is 
considered compelling academic prose. Writing that 
favors the passive voice, excessive qualification, and 
needlessly Byzantine sentence structure impresses col-
leagues even as it produces turgid prose that obscures 
rather than elucidates meaning, especially for readers 
at that prescribed eighth-grade level.41 
Not only words, but also extraverbal signifiers and 
semiotics convey information about human medical 
experimentation. As mentioned above, people who 
share language and a larger cultural and geographi-
cal identity sometimes are divided by cultural identi-
ties that differ widely — religious beliefs and customs, 
native tongue, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and 
history, especially history within the US medical cul-
ture. Just a peek into Baltimore’s history of medical 
abuses illustrates this point. 
These include the 1886 documented “burking” (a 
murder carried out to sell a body to anatomists) of 
Emily Brown,42 a white resident of the “colored sec-
tion” in Baltimore,43 the notorious rape of Henrietta 
Lacks’ cells,44 the death of Ellen Roche in a Johns 
Hopkins asthma study,45 and a 2000 Maryland court 
ruling that compared the Kennedy Krieger Institute’s 
(KKI) role in a lead-poisoning study of black chil-
dren to the Tuskegee syphilis study.46 Baltimore is 
ranked the sixth poorest city in America,47 but if the 
researcher lives in affluent Towson and the subject in 
impecunious Sandtown,48 they do not share a socio-
economic group, a divergence that is significant not 
only for health status, but also for research practice.
If the subject lives in the sort of area where public-
health agencies stand accused of colluding with land-
lords who illegally rent lead-imbued homes to families 
with small children and where public health leaders 
have orchestrated the spread of “treated” human waste 
on residents’ front lawns, he may well view research — 
and its descriptive language — more warily than the 
researcher, who lives in a community where such haz-
ards and indignities are unknown. 
In consequence, words pertaining to medical 
research and the systems they encapsulate may be 
viewed very differently by researchers and subjects. 
The disparate medical experiences of researchers and 
subjects can effectuate a higher index of suspicion in 
the latter and additional effort to understand this as 
If the subject lives in the sort of area where public-health agencies stand 
accused of colluding with landlords who illegally rent lead-imbued homes to 
families with small children and where public-health leaders have orchestrated 
the spread of “treated” human waste on residents’ front lawns, he may well view 
research — and its descriptive language — more warily than the researcher, 
who lives in a community where such hazards and indignities are unknown. 
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something other than “paranoia” must take place in 
order to convey information. Unfortunately, the glos-
sary of medical research reflects a privileged perspec-
tive and elides the ulterior enrollment, grant-seeking, 
and professional-advancement goals of researchers 
even as their statements are accepted as the default, 
“value-free,” lingo of the objective scientist. Donna 
Haraway captures this common linguistic assump-
tion in her essay “Situated Knowledges: The Science 
Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspective.” 
Scientists tell parables about objectivity and 
scientific method to students in the first years 
of their initiation…[Their] gaze claims the 
power to see and not be seen, to represent while 
escaping representation. This gaze signifies the 
unmarked positions of Man and White, one of 
the many nasty tones of the word “objectivity.”49 
In the medical-research arena, discussions of “mythol-
ogy,” “illogic,” “distrust,” “fear,” and even “paranoia” are 
culturally loaded and tend to focus upon the reticence 
and supposed psychological anomalies of subjects, 
while maintaining silence about the mythologies, 
bias, and illogic that may fuel the designs of “objec-
tive” researchers, or even about the illogical or mythi-
cal nature of the research questions that are posed. For 
example, supposed distrust, fear or even “paranoia” 
of medical research among African Americans is fre-
quently laid by researchers to one signal event, the 
Tuskegee syphilis study, even though one can do so only 
by ignoring centuries of documented abusive research 
studies conducted with black Americans.50 The large 
body of studies seeking how to determine how this one 
event created a blanket rejection of medical research 
assumes this causal connection without evidence and 
so constitutes an example of mythology on the part 
of scientists, a mythology that is not subjected to the 
stricter scrutiny of African American fears. 
One corrective would be to substitute fact for 
mythology by acknowledging this occult history and 
by using the neutral term “iatrophobia,” from the 
Greek iatros and phobia and meaning “a fear of heal-
ers”: This term avoids the unsubstantiated judgment 
inherent in “paranoia.” 
When researchers do acknowledge 
troubling lapses or breaches of research 
ethics or performance during commu-
nication with subjects, these breaches 
are often qualified as “past abuses” 
with no evidence offered that these and 
similar errors are confined to the past. 
Just as the tendency to ascribe fears to 
single event tacitly judges subjects by 
implying that their broad aversion to 
research studies is an overreaction to 
a single event, so the unsubstantiated 
location of such abuses “in the past” implies that today, 
a subject’s concerns are groundless. 
Blood Rites
Unfortunately, there are plenty of contemporary 
examples of research abuse and miscommunication 
as exemplified by the PolyHeme study, conducted 
between 2005 and 2007 at 26 sites in the US and 
Canada. It well illustrates the communication gap 
between researchers and subjects, because a plethora 
of communications errors, including misused terms, 
operated to deceive subjects about the nature of the 
research. However, these errors did not prevent 
informed consent, because there was never a provi-
sion for giving consent, informed or otherwise, in the 
experiment. That experiment was designed to test the 
biological PolyHeme, a hemoglobin-based oxygen car-
rier (HBOC) blood substitute that was the only pat-
ented product of Northfield Laboratories. Northfield 
anticipated a $6 billion dollar market for artificial 
blood should it win approval. Following a disastrous 
hospital study that ended in high rates of heart prob-
lems and death, PolyHeme was tested in clinical trials 
without informed consent, in fact, without obtaining 
any species of consent whatever from subjects. 
Any trauma victim who lived in one of the Poly-
Heme test cities could be unwittingly enrolled in the 
study and given either the experimental substance or 
the standard of care. Here’s how: When the ambulance 
raced to the scene of a trauma such as a car accident 
or gunshot wound, the EMTs paused before beginning 
treatment to open a manila envelope with a computer 
readout that told them which modality to give the vic-
tim: PolyHeme or the standard of care.
Someone who lived in a study city and did not want 
to participate had to contact the company to receive 
a bright blue plastic bracelet that read, “I decline the 
When researchers do acknowledge troubling 
lapses or breaches of research ethics or 
performance during communication with 
subjects, these breaches are often qualified as 
“past abuses” with no evidence offered that these 
and similar errors are confined to the past.
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PolyHeme study,” then wear that bracelet at all times, 
every day. 
Of course, the catch was that you had to know that 
the study was taking place, and then discover whence 
to obtain the bracelet. Most residents knew neither. 
In fact, bracelets were not always available. In Seattle, 
a different no-consent study ran out of bracelets after 
publicity caused alarmed urbanites to flood research-
ers with so many requests that they ran out of brace-
lets — for a year. This left no way to opt out, and they 
were not alone: people visiting or driving through 
study areas could not opt out if they suffered a qualify-
ing injury in the wrong part of town. 
These studies differ from presumed consent, in 
which a subject is “presumed” to consent in that the 
according to CFR 21 50. 24, the subject’s right to con-
sent is waived altogether without reservation, and no 
assumption, however tenuous, is made that he would 
acquiesce.51
I have referred to these as “no-consent” studies 
because this failure to elicit consent is the salient fea-
ture that the average layperson (and potential subject) 
would find of greatest interest and concern. But this 
is not the way the medical community and literature 
refers to Northfield’s PolyHeme study, the later Resus-
citation Outcomes Consortium (ROC) study nor the 
myriad of similar studies that dispensed with consent 
under CFR 21 50.24. Instead, they employ the above-
mentioned acronym EFIC or simply refer to them as 
“emergency research,” studies. These lexical semantics 
simultaneously provide a rationale for the study — to 
learn how better to treat emergencies — and neatly 
sidestep the fact that no consent is sought and most 
subjects have no viable way to refuse participation. 
Verbal Chameleons 
Other word choices by Northfield and its researchers 
offered similar semantic sleights of hand. Early in the 
study, the company announced that it was offering 
“community consent” in lieu of informed consent.52 
This species of “consent” consisted of meetings notify-
ing anyone who attended about the study. The study 
design was presented as a fait accompli, and no con-
sent was elicited. Clearly these meetings met no objec-
tive definition of “consent,” and some years later, the 
language was changed to “community notification,” 
also a misleading term because the meetings were 
relatively sparsely attended. 
The content of the standardized Powerpoint slides 
used to explain the study during these meetings as well 
as public statements from researchers reveal other 
consistent and telling distortions of language, includ-
ing a number of frequently misused terms. PolyHeme 
is referred to as a “treatment” which encourages what 
the late Jay Katz called the “therapeutic illusion,” by 
encouraging the research subjects to think of them-
selves as “patients” and this leads the lay audience to 
suppose that PolyHeme’s efficacy and safety have been 
demonstrated: they had not. 
Shortly after the adoption of CFR 21 50.24, Katz 
wrote, 
 …one of my most fundamental objections to the 
regulation is this: that in its emphasis on thera-
peutic benefits, the FDA obscures the fact that 
some of the permissible research activities either 
hold out no promise for therapeutic benefit or 
are so vaguely defined that potential therapeu-
tic benefit can be inferred when research is the 
predominant intent. Research is not treatment, 
and whenever clear distinctions are not made 
between the two, the waiver of informed con-
sent becomes problematic because some human 
subjects are being recruited to serve the ends of 
others.53
Another community meeting slide insists that Poly-
heme is safe with “no known problems” — despite the 
injuries and deaths that marked the earlier hospital 
study and a long history of similar heart and excess-
mortality problems in many earlier HBOC studies, 
which is documented in a 2008 JAMA article.54 
Most critically, these semantic lapses expose a cru-
cial, but often overlooked distinction between patients 
and research subjects. That is, another misleading 
semantic lapse is that subjects are often referred to 
as “patients,” which implies a therapeutic relationship 
between the subject and the researchers that does not 
exist. Neither do the rights that accrue to a patient, 
such as the right to expect the best possible individu-
alized treatment: yet subjects do not always under-
stand this, as the Katz pointed out.55 The perception 
of the physician as healer focused on the need of the 
patient before him is at odds with the physician’s role 
as a researcher, and many subjects don’t make this 
mental leap to understand that the wholly protec-
tive relationship is denied to the subject. In fact, the 
engineered confusion of “subject” and “patient” in the 
PolyHeme study backfired when the Duke University 
IRB temporarily suspended its arm of the study after 
it discovered that the PolyHeme study violated North 
Carolina’s Patient’s Bill of Rights. The study later pro-
ceeded, after receiving a waiver. 
A similarly troubling description of an experimental 
reference to “safe” comes to mind. Kennedy Krieger 
Institute promised to help parents find “lead-safe 
housing” for their lead-poisoned children and enrolled 
them in a contested study. Yet researchers knew that 
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the housing in question was imbued with lead that 
poisoned some of these children. No definition of 
“lead-safe” was given in the consent form, and a rea-
sonable layperson would infer that such housing did 
not pose a lead threat to his child. 
Other problematic words that arise during the con-
sent process are noted in a 1995 article entitled “Who 
Understands? A Survey of 25 Words or Phrases Com-
monly Used in Proposed Clinical Research Consent 
Forms.”56 But with apologies to James Kunen,57 I can 
think of no greater example of the power of an adjec-
tive to modify a noun than the use of the word “pre-
sumed” before the word “consent” — unless of course, 
one considers the other unusual species of “consent” 
that have been used by researchers, but which would 
surely mystify subjects. The accompanying chart “A 
Bestiary of Involition” lists some examples. 
Semiotics and the Therapeutic Illusion
Nonverbal signs and their interpretations reinforce 
the “therapeutic illusion” of clinical care that Katz 
decried in 1996. In the perception of subjects, tradi-
tional images and accouterments of the healer convey 
personalized care. The setting of a hospital or clinic, 
a white coat, clipboard stethoscope, thermometer, 
sphygmomanometer, and the taking of a medical his-
tory are closely associated with the image of a healer 
caring for his patient, as is the act of taking vital signs 
and drawing blood as well as other familiar aspects of 
the medical gaze. Throughout the subject’s life, these 
have been encountered in healing sessions and these 
signs militate against the researcher’s very different 
role as guardian of the study’s ends and scientific pro-
tocol, which can be at odds with the optimal welfare of 
any individual subject. 
Even the blue and green plastic bracelets dispensed 
to people who wished to avoid participation in the 
nonconsensual PolyHeme and ROC studies recall 
the plastic bracelets affixed to patients in hospitals 
as a sign they are under the hospitals’ and doctors’ 
care. People also associate modern ambulances with 
the rapid deployment of expert personalized medical 
response closely tailored to the patients’ individual 
condition, whether giving fluids or performing CPR in 
response to immediate needs. Sirens, flashing lights, 
and speed signify responsive, highly individualized 
care. But in nonconsensual studies like that of Poly-
Heme, the ambulance becomes a mobile laboratory 
where attendants’ response is dictated by a computer 
printout that they are required to consult and act upon 
in accordance to the randomized study protocol, not in 
response to the patient’s signs, symptoms, or immedi-
ate needs. In such an ambulance setting, where every 
sign points to personalized emergent clinical care, the 
failure to inform a subject that he is indeed a subject, 
not a patient, seems especially egregious.
Newspeak: Purging “Experimentation” 
During a university lecture about my book, Medical 
Apartheid: The Dark History of Experimentation on 
Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Pres-
ent, an auditor criticized my use of the term “medical 
experiments” as “inflammatory.” I was a bit surprised, 
given that I had limned the etymology of “experiment,” 
including the definition given by Claude Bernard, 
author of An Introduction to the Study of Experimen-
tal Medicine, who wrote, “Experiment is fundamen-
tally only induced observation.” But I also remem-
bered enough high-school Latin to shed some light 
on the discomfort. Periculum, “danger,” is an inher-
ent part of “experiment” — the word and the thing. 
To experiment is to risk success or failure and when 
human lives and health hang in the balance, the stakes 
are high indeed. 
It is true that terms such as “medical study” have 
come to be preferred, and for understandable reason: 
they now seem more benign. But these terms are not 
more accurate when the researcher manipulates vari-
ables and observes the effects on the bodies and minds 
of human subjects. Human medical experimentation 
is an accepted umbrella term for many of the more 
popular variants, so why does it provoke such wide 
discomfort? After all, from the inception of modern 
ethical research assessments, “experimentation” was 
the default general term, wielded by investigators as 
well as by their critics. The first reference to human 
medical investigations, in the Nuremberg Code’s first 
tenet, uses “experiment” twice when it reads in part 
“…before the acceptance of an affirmative decision 
by the experimental subject, there should be made 
known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of 
the experiment.”58
The early authoritative classics of the field, 
from  Henry K. Beecher’s 1959 Experimentation in 
Man and his advisor Maurice Pappworth’s 1967 
Human Guinea Pigs Here and Now: Experimentation 
on Man use the verboten word. The title of Jay Katz’ 
seminal Experimentation with Human Beings: The 
Authority of the Investigator, Subject, Professions, and 
State in the Human Experimentation Process, like the 
Nuremberg Code, uses it twice. 
Neither do respected works by research insiders shy 
from the term, such as Who Goes First? The Story of 
Self-Experimentation in Medicine, by Lawrence K. 
Altman, or The Human Radiation Experiments by the 
Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experi-
ments. As recently as 2015, Oxford Brookes professor 
Paul Weindling published his Victims and Survivors 
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of Nazi Human Experiments: Science and Suffering in 
the Holocaust. 
But by the time I began a public health fellowship 
in 1992, the word “experimentation” was beginning to 
mutate. In fact, the fate of the word “mutation” itself 
provides a good parallel for the trajectory of “experi-
ment” in the human-research context. 
English evolves, and words, like living things, sur-
vive by changing in response to the pressure of expe-
riences. The word “mutation” from the Latin verb 
mutare, to change, originally referred to tissue or 
genetic changes induced by radiation in a neutral or 
even benign manner, as when tumors shrunk after 
exposure: “mutation” was devoid of dread. By 1911, 
however, more than fifty cases of X-ray-induced can-
cer had been reported in researchers who worked with 
radioactive substances, followed by the ugly deaths of 
the young “radium girls who painted dials luminous 
watch dials with radium-226 and mesothorium. After 
World War II, the carnage in the wake of the Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki bombings joined the cancers 
induced in X-ray epilation clinics where physicians 
did a brisk business in removing coarse dark facial 
and arm hair of Eastern European immigrants and 
bleaching the skins of African Americans — all of 
whom were rewarded with burns and cancers instead 
of “whiteness”. Such reports helped transform the 
public image of radiation and American scientists as 
willing to exploit radiation’s power for twisted curios-
ity or wealth.59 The word “mutation” now fills Ameri-
cans with dread.
Similarly, researchers now dislike “experiment” and 
not only because it reminds subjects of the dramatic 
domestic abuses of such as that of African Americans 
and prisoners, and abroad, of Jews and others under 
National Socialism. “Experiment” also reminds us 
of the danger, or periculum, inherent in even well-
designed, ethically conducted research. Research 
subjects wish to avoid “experiment” for the same rea-
son. As Carl Elliott points out in his perceptive essay, 
“Whatever Happened to Human Experimentation?” 
in a 1995 Advisory Committee on Human Radiation 
Experiments survey,60 patients ranked the phrase 
“medical study” as the most benign, and “medical 
experiment” as so hazardous that some would risk 
joining one only if they were terminally ill.” Elliott 
clarifies that “[n]ot all research studies are experi-
ments. Nor are they all clinical trials. Chart reviews, 
surveys, ethnographies, epidemiological studies, and 
many other kinds of medical research could hardly 
be described as ‘experiments,’ insofar as ‘experiments’ 
suggests scientific testing conducted under 
controlled conditions.”61
Many studies and enterprises are perfectly 
described as human medical experimenta-
tion, but censorship reigns: The term has 
been, Elliott writes, “purged,” and the result-
ing newspeak, like so many other problem-
atic linguistic choices discussed in this essay, 
serves to reinforce the therapeutic illusion by 
masking the hazards of human studies. Elliott 
cogently points out that ethicists, who one might 
expect to decry the bowdlerization, do not and this 
may be because so many ethicists receive checks and 
academic appointments from and sit on the boards of 
the research institutions that they ostensibly moni-
tor, so that their interests are closely aligned with the 
institutions that shy from the word. 
Conclusion
This essay seeks to show that words are powerful and 
that word choices can limit our ability to carry out the 
communication mandates upon which consent rests. 
In Nineteen Eighty-Four, Orwell warns us, “The pur-
pose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium 
of expression for the world-view and mental habits 
proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other 
modes of thought impossible.”62
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